Учебная работа. East Timor Independence
East Timor Independence
East Timor Independence?
Contents.
. Introduction …………………………………………………………….. 3
. Ethnological origin, demography and policy …………………………. 3
. Before and after the arrival of the Europeans ……………………….. 6
. Japanese occupation during World War II ……………………………7
. The Portuguese colonial empire ……………………………………….. 8
. Indonesian invasion …………………………………………………….. 10
. Introduction to Indonesia ………………………………………………. 12
. Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno ……………………………… 13
. Formation of East-Timorese political associations …………………… 17
. The parties ………………………………………………………………. 18
. Australian support ………………………………………………………. 21
. USA admits Timorese right to self-determination …………………….. 23
. Indonesia admits independence …………………………………………. 23
. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese
Republic on the Question of East Timor ……………………………….. 24
. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 26
Introduction.
It is not easy to write with feigned calm and dispassion about the
events that have been unfolding in East Timor. Horror and shame are
compounded by the fact that the crimes are so familiar and could so easily
have been halted by the international community a long time ago.
Timor, the Malay Word for «Orient», is an island of the Malay
Archipelago, the largest and easternmost of the Lesser Sundas, lying
between parallels 8 deg. 17′ and 10 deg. 22′ of south latitude and
meridians 123 deg. 25′ and 127 deg. 19′ of latitude east from Greenwich. It
is bathed by the Indian Ocean (Timor Sea) at South, and Pacific Ocean
(Banda Sea) at North and has an oblong configuration in the direction of
southwest — northeast. The island is surrounded by the Roti and Saval
islands through the Roti Strait, by the Lomblem, Pantar and Ombai islands
across the Ombai Strait and by Kissar isle to the northeast. Southwards,
Australia dists about 500 km, and 1000 km separates the southwest
Timor from Java.
The total area of Timor is of 32 350 sq km, measuring the maximums of
470 km in length and 110 km in width. About 480 km wide, and a surface of
450 000 sq km, the Timor Sea which is divided between the two territories,
opening west into the Indian Ocean and east into the Arafura Sea, part of
the Pacific Ocean.
The territory of the island — East Timor— of which Portugal was
recognized administrative power by United Nations, occupies an estimated
area of almost 19 000 km, and comprises the eastern half of the island,
with 265 km in length and 92 km of maximum width and an area of 16 384 km
and the enclave of Ocussi-Ambeno that dists 70 km from Batugadi, with 2 461
sq km and a coastline 48 km long. Still part of East Timor is the island of
Ataero (or Pulo-Cambing) with 144 sq km, just 23 km northwards of the
capital Dili and the tiny isle of Jaco with 8 sq km, being the oriental
extreme of East Timor just ahead of Tutuala.
Ethnological origin, demography and policy.
There are 12 ethnic groups in East Timor each of which has its own
language: 9 Austronesian language groups — Tetum, Mambai, Tokodede, Kemak,
Galoli, Idate, Waima’a, Naueti; and 3 Papuan language groups — Bunak,
Makasae, Fatuluku. The Tetum live in two separate geographic areas within
East Timor. A simplified version of the Tetum language was utilised in Dili
by the Portuguese as a lingua franca. This language has spread throughout
East Timor so that Tetum, in its original or simplified form, came to be
spoken by about 60% of the population. Though widespread, it is not
understood by all.
One of the first references to the natives of East Timor is expressed
in the description that in 1514 the Portuguese Rui de Brito sent to king D.
Manuel. In our free transcription, he wrote in these terms: “Timor is an
island beyond Java, has plenty sandalwood, plenty honey, plenty wax, hasn’t
junks for navigating, is a big island of kaffirs.”
The `kaffir’ is meant to refer to the “black and of troubled hair”.
Timorese what, not being untrue, was an imprecise observation as the type
was to be found only in some regions, specially in Ocussi, and generically
in West Timor.
From the antrophological For centuries the East Timorese had been farmers, living in scattered
hamlets and eating what they grew. Only a few coastal East Timorese were
fishermen. Trading and shop keeping had for generations been in the hands
of the Chinese. East Timor is extremely mountainous, so the majority of
East Timorese had always lived in isolation, far from towns and foreign
influences, tied to their fields and animistic practices. In spite of
centuries of Catholic missionary work by the Portuguese, in 1975 animists
still numbered as much as 72 % of the population. The local Timorese kings
still played an important part in their lives and allegiances, whilst
interference from Portuguese administrators and military was almost non-
existent.
In the period between World War 2 and the 1975 Indonesian invasion, a
number of East Timorese managed to gain an education in the colony’s few
schools. Some were mestizos, of Timorese and Portuguese parentage, others
were Timorese from traditional ruling families, but the majority were
native Timorese who gained their education through the Catholic minor
seminary. The emergence of this small educated elite in the 1960s and 1970s
ensured that, when the Portuguese left East Timor in 1975, these people
with schooling, and nationalist aspirations, became the territory’s
leaders.
Politically, socially and ethnologically Timorese differ amongst
themselves in groups. There is the division in independent sucos
(kingdoms), the distinction between the Atoni tribes of the Servian
kingdom, in West Timor, and the Belos of the Portuguese territory, groups
such as the Firacos, ethnic designation adopted by the Timorese in between
Baucau and Luca, or the Caladi which are the inhabitants of the central
crest , Malays and non-Malays, so many «sucos» and more than twenty
languages and dialects, the contribution of the exogamy, of parties
irreconcilable. In conclusion, that is the expression of a relative absence
of bio-ethnic unity of the populations.
The history of a People and their Culture voted to banishment from
their motherland, the eastern half of an island, former Portuguese colony
is the much unknown. Timor lies in South East Asia enclosed in world’s
largest archipelago. That is Indonesia, which gave it’s name to the
Republic constituted after the dutch withdrawl. Since the beginning,
Indonesian governments have experienced resistance coming from independist
movements of various islands which claim ethnical and cultural diveristy
from the predominant Javanese type. Nonetheless they were continuously
silenced thus unable to internationalize the situation to a stage that
would force foreign intervention. When it became inevitable, in that single
exception of the western half of New Guinea, the autodetermination of the
papuans in favour of an integration in Indonesia was observed as an
Indonesian orchestrated act, and remembered until today as the darkest
episode in the history of UN.
Indonesia couldn’t either afford the regional instability that the
prospect of a small nation rising in between the empire would arouse .This
solitary piece of territory and it’s inhabitants had to be sacrificed for a
hugger cause.
Portugal which’s vast colonial possessions had once made the country
great, with times had become responsible for it’s retardment. The drawling
of the situation was put to an end with a successful coup d’etat, in April
’74, which engaged a national revolution ceasing dictatorship and commited
to decolonization. Meanwhile, if East Timor, due to distance and expense,
was already the most forgotten colony, less attention it was given towards
the definition of it’s future as the longed changes in the metropolis
didn’t avoid internal deviations and contradictions. It brought instability
to the government of the country and the urgence to lay the basis of
democracy.
For Indonesia however, the solution was announced: annexation by any
terms. As it couldn’t be done without cover-up, the Indonesian accounted
the «ignorance» of Timor’s closest neighbor, Australia, offering access to
the Timor Gap for oil. The maintenance of economic and institutional
relations was (is) too important. Necessary non-interference from
superpower USA was also naturally reached. Having the Americans weakened
their position in South East Asia after Vietnam, Indonesia was regarded as
the last great bastion of anti-communism in the region, essentially in
those years for reasons of military strategy as we’ll see ahead. Thus
friendly relations were very important to preserve.
So, in name of political, economical and military goals, with two
major countries making it possible for the pretender of East Timor, and
before the impotence of Administrative Power Portugal, Indonesia invaded in
December ’75, interrupting a process of decolonization in course. The
action was promptly condemned by the United Nations. Although in face of
International Law, and of the most elementary human rights, Indonesia is
regularly criticized by the International Community, East Timor remains
still insignificant to put at stake superior governmental interests.
As the case of East Timor becomes more of a serious arrow nailed in
the flank of Indonesia’s diplomacy, Jakarta multiplies efforts to gain
votes amongst countries who normally vote against in the sessions of UN,
the mediator of the discussions between Portugal and Indonesia (without
Timorese representation) to avoid further embarrassments that have resulted
uncomfortable for its economic relations, and desirable leading role
amongst the Non-Aligned Movement, the same that combated colonialism.
Nevertheless the same policy persists for Timor. As if once the
annexation has been carried out it urges by all means to prove the
righteousness of such action.
For the last 19 years, an excess of 200 000 Timorese have been killed
by the Indonesians. The Resistance arms itself with the weapons captured
from the enemy. Women, the aged and the children are concentrated in camps
where they do forced labour and many starve to death. Suspects are
tortured, spanking and sexual abuse are constant, many women have been
sterilized. Family members are deliberately aparted. Transmigration
programs project the definite dissolution of the Maubere People.
Before and after the arrival of the Europeans
Previous to the European interference in the indigenous scheme of
life, the island of Timor was inhabited by barbarian people that couldn’t
write but used iron and was already agricultural. Industry was limited to
the fabrication of cotton cloths with which they covered themselves and the
commerce reduced to the trade of wax and sandalwood for certain products
that brought to Timor makasare, malays and javanese.
Much before the arrival of Portuguese and Dutch, Timor was part of the
commercial nets politically centered east of Java, after in the Celebes,
and linked by trade to China and India. In documents published during the
Ming dynasty, in 1436, the commercial value of Timor is put in relief and
described as a place where “the mountains are covered by trees of
sandalwood producing the country nothing else”. One of the first Portuguese
to visit the island, Duarte Barbosa, wrote in 1518: “there’s an abundance
of sandalwood, white, to which the Muslims in India and Persia give great
value and where much of it is used”.
Other products were exported such as honey, wax and slaves, but trade
relied mainly on sandalwood.
Japanese occupation during World War II
During the Second World War, Portugal declared a policy of neutrality.
Dutch and Australian troops nonetheless disembarked at East Timor in
disrespect of Portuguese sovereignty. But the real menace came with the
Japanese invasion, three months later, in February of 1942. The island
became a stage of war between Japanese and the allieds. Timorese were seen
as secondary actors when in truth, after crossing a period of rebellion
against Portuguese rule, were they the more sacrificed during the
resistance until 1945.
In spite of Portugal’s policy of neutrality, the Australian and Dutch
troops entered in Timor. It was the first of two foreigner military
invasions. In Lisbon, Oliveira de Salazar denounced the allied disembark as
an invasion of a neutral territory. Shortly after arrived the Japanese.
It’s not to admire that J. Santos Carvalho saw in these actions an attitude
of depreciation towards the sovereignty of Portugal. When the allied forces
arrived at Dili in December the 17th of 1941, he says that governor
Ferreira de Carvalho, without means to retaliate by arms ordered the
national flag to be hoisted in all public partitions and buildings of the
colony. To further mark his position of neutrality he confined himself to
his residence and, by free determination, wished to be considered prisoner.
The population of the capital went to live in the interior, mainly in
Aileu, Liquie and Maubara. Some of the few Portuguese that remained in Dili
pursued nevertheless with their usual lives, socializing with the forces
stationed in Timor. They were given instructions by the local government to
maintain a correct attitude but to show no familiarity neither to
collaborate. An atmosphere of normality gain form, and some families were
prepared to go back. It is even reported that an agreement signed by
English and Portuguese governments defined that the allied troops would
retire as soon as arrived a contingent of Portuguese forces from Maputo
(Mozambique).
What happened instead was the Japanese invasion of Dili, in February
of 1942. During January they had managed to occupy Malaysia (except
Singapore), the Philippines (but not Bataan), Borneo and the Celebes,
Birmania, New Guinea and the Salmon islands. Following general L. M.
Chassin — “at the end of the second month of an hyperbolic invasion , the
Japanese tide extended itself irresistibly beyond paralyzed and impotent
adversaries.” In the middle of February they invaded Sumatra occupying
Palembang, soon after Singapore is attacked and many Englishmen are made
prisoners. Java was surrounded and on the 20th, Bali and Timor were taken.
After a weak resistance , the Dutch troops abandoned by the Javanese
soldiers — which were in majority —, escaped to the interior leaving
behind armament. Dili was then violently sacked by the Japanese, who found
the city almost uninhabited.
The Portuguese colonial empire
Up to the final years of dictatorship in Portugal, in spite of the
condemnation of UN and the start of the guerrilla warfare in the African
colonies of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, the Portuguese Colonial Empire
was defended by the government as an heritage of the glorious past and
motive of national pride. However, the crescent expenses of it’s
maintenance begun to reflect increasingly on the economy and social tissue
of the metropolis, what provoked crescent discontentment of the population,
finally leading to the Revolution of ’74 that installed democracy and gave
independence to the colonies. East Timor was invaded by Indonesia precisely
in the course of decolonization.
During dictatorship, the colonies continued to be dedicated
considerable interest. For the nationalist ideology that characterized the
regime, the vast regions of the World under Portuguese sovereignty were to
be seen as the justification of a necessary conscience of greatness and
pride to be Portuguese.
The expression «Portuguese Colonial Empire» would be generalized and
even met official formalization. Colonial patrimony was considered as the
remaining spoils of the Portuguese conquests of the glorious period of
expansion.
These notions were mystified but also expressed in Law as in 1930
Oliveira de Salazar (at the time minister of Finances and, for some time of
the Colonies) published the Colonial Act. It stated some fundamental
principles for the overseas territorial administration and proclaimed that
it was “of the organic essence of the Portuguese nation to possess and
colonize overseas territories and to civilize indigenous populations there
comprised”. The overseas dimension of Portugal was however soon put at
stake after World War II. The converging interest of the two victorious
superpowers on the re-distribution of World regions productors of raw
materials contributed for an international agreement on the legal right for
all peoples to their own government. Stated as a fundamental principle of
the UN Charter, anti-colonialism gave thrust to the independist movements
of the colonies, and in matter of time unavoidably accepted by the great
colonial nations: England, France, Netherlands, Belgium. Yet such countries
relied on mechanisms of economical domination that would last, assuring
that political independence wouldn’t substantially affect the structure of
trade relations.
Loss of the Indian territories and the reactions. The first problem
that the Portuguese had to deal with was the conflict with the Indian
Union, independent state in 1947. The Indian nationalism had triumphed over
the English occupation, and in 1956 forced the French to abandon their
establishments in 1956. The same was demanded to the Portuguese over their
territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, but in face of refusal. India severed
the diplomatic relations. The passage through Indian territory in order to
reach the two enclaves dependent of Daman was denied since 1954, and
despite the recognition of such right by International Court of Justice
recognized t (1960), Dadrб and Nagar Haveli were effectively lost. This was
followed by mass invasions of passive resisters which Portuguese were still
able to hinder until December 19 of 1961, when the Indian Union made
prevail it’s superior military force, to obtain final retreat of the
Portuguese.
Goa had been capital of the Portuguese expansion to the East.
Conquered in 1510 by Afonso de Albuquerque, it was also an active center of
religious diffusion to the
“doctrinal involucre of interest to which the Portuguese were completely
strange was rapidly adopted by the intellectual groups, in great part
responsible for the formation of the public opinion”. That’s how Saraiva
justifies that the protests for the loss of Goa to the Indian Union were
directed less to the foreign power than to the Portuguese authorities, “for
not having known to negotiate a modus viviendi acceptable for both parts”.
More than that, he detects in this curious reaction a tendency that would
accentuate along the two following decades: the crisis of patriotism. To
defend or to exalt the national values appeared to the bourgeois elites of
the 60’s as a provincial attitude, expression of cultural under-
development.
Indonesian invasion
Indonesia invaded the territory in December 1975, relying on US
diplomatic support and arms, used illegally but with secret authorisation
from Washington; new arms shipments were sent under the cover of an
official «embargo».
There was no need to threaten bombing or even sanctions. It would have
sufficed for the US and its allies to withdraw active participation and
inform their associates in the Indonesian military command that the
atrocities must be terminated and the territory granted the right of self-
determination, as upheld by the United Nations and the international court
of justice. “We cannot undo the past, but should at least be willing to
recognise what we have done, and face the moral responsibility of saving
the remnants and providing reparations” — a small gesture of compensation
for terrible crimes.
Many were immediately killed, while their villages were burned down to
the ground. Others run to the mountains in the heart of their land, and
organized a resistance movement. These brave peasants — and their sons —
have opposed the barbarian indonesian soldiers for 23 years now. Torture,
rape, all kinds of physical, sexual and psychological violations, violent
repression and brutal murder have been the daily life of the Maubere people
(the original people of East Timor) since.
Even before president Habibie’s surprise call for a referendum this
year, the army anticipated threats to its rule, including its control over
East Timor’s resources, and undertook careful planning with «the aim, quite
simply… to destroy a nation».
The plans were known to western intelligence. The army recruited
thousands of West Timorese and brought in forces from Java. More ominously,
the military command sent units of its dreaded US-trained Kopassus special
forces and, as senior military adviser, General Makarim, a US-trained
intelligence specialist with «a reputation for callous violence».
Terror and destruction began early in the year. The army forces
responsible have been described as «rogue elements» in the west. There is
good reason, however, to accept Bishop Belo’s assignment of direct
responsibility to General Wiranto. It appears that the militias have been
managed by elite units of Kopassus, the «crack special forces unit» that
had «been training regularly with US and Australian forces until their
behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign friends».
These forces adopted the tactics of the US Phoenix programme in the
Vietnam war, which killed tens of thousands of peasants and much of the
indigenous South Vietnamese leadership, as well as «the tactics employed by
the Contras» in Nicaragua. The state terrorists were «not simply going
after the most radical pro-independence people, but… the moderates, the
people who have influence in their community.»
Well before the referendum, the commander of the Indonesian military
in Dili, Colonel Tono Suratman, warned of what was to come: «If the pro-
independents do win… all will be destroyed. It will be worse than 23
years ago». An army document of early May, when international agreement on
the referendum was reached, ordered «massacres should be carried out from
village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro-
independence supporters win». The independence movement «should be
eliminated from its leadership down to its roots».
Citing diplomatic, church and militia sources, the Australian press
reported that «hundreds of modern assault rifles, grenades and mortars are
being stockpiled, ready for use if the autonomy option is rejected at the
ballot box».
All of this was understood by Indonesia’s «foreign friends», who also
knew how to bring the terror to an end, but preferred evasive and ambiguous
reactions that the Indonesian generals could easily interpret as a «green
light» to carry out their work.
The sordid history must be viewed against the Background of US-
Indonesia relations in the postwar era. The rich resources of the
archipelago, and its critical strategic location, guaranteed it a central
role in US global planning. These factors lie behind US efforts 40 years
ago to dismantle Indonesia, perceived as too independent and too democratic
— even permitting participation of the poor peasants. These factors account
for western support for the regime of killers and torturers who emerged
from the 1965 coup.
Their achievements were seen as a vindication of Washington’s wars in
Indochina, motivated in large part by concerns that the «Virus» of
independent nationalism might «infect» Indonesia, to use Kissinger-like
rhetoric.
The recent convulsions inside Indonesia — with its people finally
crying for freedom and democracy — and the Nobel Peace Prize of 1996 —
shared between Bishop Belo, a dominican supporting the Maubere people in
Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, a politician and activist who represents the
Resistance historic leader, Xanana Gusmao, imprisioned in Indonesia for a
20-year sentence — have brought a new hope to the fight of this martyr
people. Also, economic crisis hitting south-east Asia has shaken the
dictatorship in Jakarta more than ever. The winds of change blowing
throughout Indonesia started to hit East Timor…
Introduction to Indonesia
Indonesia is the country with the more of Muslims in the world which
means 87 per cent of 180 million habitants. Nevertheless, the major part of
the declared Muslims mix their faith in Allah with animistic or Hindu-
Buddhist beliefs. These are reminiscences of the Indian colonization that
would be interrupted with the penetration of Islam in the 16th century,
generally superficial and incomplete.
Due to the insular configuration, composed by 13 677 islands, 3 000
inhabited, and with an approximate Java, where
the density is one of the highest. The solution passes inevitably by birth
control and transmigration to territories such as Papua New Guinea,
recently East Timor but also in between with the evident purpose of
dissolving local cultures in the predominant Javanese which is only one
amongst 360 tribal and ethno-linguistic groups and more than 250 different
languages and dialects.
The Dutch colonial Domain had been massively based in Java, with the
rest of the archipelago had developed very unequally. From the rigid
Islamic areas of North Sumatra to the tribes of Borneo or the Christian
islands of the east, a variety of economic and social systems experienced
very distinct problems for their progress.
Independence of Indonesia and Sukarno
At the time of Indonesia’s proclamation of independence in 1945,
President Sukarno defined an ideological base for the state — the «Panca
sila» (meaning «five virtues») — to be followed by all citizens and sworn
by the social organizations. Main principles imposed were the adoption of
Indonesian «Bahasa» language and the acceptance of one among five religions
— Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism — forbidding
the animist cults and other traditional practices. Thus «Panca sila» was
assumed as an instrument of governmental control and a mean to javanize the
diverse cultures.
But not without much internal opposition. Illuded with the possibility
of the creation of an official Islamic state, when Suharto reached to
power, Communist administrators and Islamic movements supported the
Revolution, but what they didn’t expect was the minor concessions offered,
and once annihilated the Communist Party, an “important preoccupation of
the government has been to control, domesticate or destroy the most
orthodox and active Muslim factions” (Prof. A. Barbedo de Magalhгes, Oporto
University). Since then they oftenly erupt in riots against the military
aristocracy, basically syncretic in matter of religion.
Besides reaffirming the «Panca sila», in 1982 Suharto introduced the
Law of the Associations which would fasten the strain on political,
religious and social associations as it increased the powers of the
administration to dismiss or impute directors to the aggregations, to
destroy or agglutinate them in others more vast and controlled by the
militaries.
Social and Political instability is patent in public insurrections in
favor of democracy, which in September of 1984 culminated with the killing
of 60 Muslims and imprisonment of important personalities such as of former
governors that defied an inquiry to the incident.
Neo-colonialism in Indonesia? Many authors mention that Sukarno had a
dream: the formation of a great Indonesia comprising the totality of the
ancient Dutch East Indies, inclusive the non-Indonesian population. For
this reason had he renounced to the federate structures initially conceived
for the creation of the United States of Indonesia — thus betraying the
agreement with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty —, in favor of an
unitary constitution, although still provisional. The new direction was
taken in August of 1950, three months after an unilateral declaration of
independence by the South Moluccas.
The first elections, free and democratic in fact, would be held in
1955, but disputed by more or less 170 parties! Their differences naturally
brought difficulties to the functioning of the parliamentary democracy. On
one hand, between the exponents of pre-Islamic syncretism of the «Nahdatul
Ulama» (NU) and the orthodox Moslems of the «Masyumi», which’s vital
strength came from the outside — West Sumatra and North Celebes besides
Occidental Java (Sundanese ethnic origin). On the other hand, between the
Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Communist Party (PKI), based in Java, and
these with the Moslems.
The inefficiency of the administration, which passed through seven
governments since 1949 to ’57, and the rivalry engaged by the parties
alone, in contrast with the heroism of the Revolution of August 17th, after
all, the concentration of decision and power in Java as restrictor of the
economic, social and cultural development aroused at the end tension in the
exterior islands.
In February of 1957, Sukarno criticized the Western liberal democracy
because unadapted to Indonesian particularity. He interfered more in the
constitutional processes and appeals to his concept of «Guided Democracy»,
founded on indigenous procedures: the important questions should be decided
through prolonged deliberations («musyawarah») in order to obtain consensus
(«mukafat»). This was the practice in the village and the same model ought
to be adopted for the nation. Sukarno proposed a government formed by the
four main parties and a national council represented by parties and
functional groups in which, under the guidance of the president (himself),
consensus would express itself.
In spite of the charisma gained by Sukarno as father of the country
and mentor of the principle «unity in diversity», he was unable to avoid
the proclamations of the martial law in March of 1957 as a response to the
regional dissidences which reached their peak.
At the end of the year a further set-back was brought by the defeat of
a motion for the renewal of negotiations concerning the destiny of West New
Guinea. In a series of direct actions across the country, Dutch property
was seized with the Indonesian government taking over. In the beginning of
1958 West Sumatra claimed for the constitution of a new central government
under the leadership of Hatta, a moderate and historic figure of the
Revolution, from the start vice-president of Sukarno up until two years ago
when he resigned because disagreeing with his policy. Ignored the appeal of
the Sumatrese a new revolutionary government was formed, supported by
leaders of the Masyumi Party, including the ex-Prime Ministers Natsir
(September 1950 — March ’51) and Harahap (August ’55 — March ’56). The
military commandant of the North Celebes joined the initiative, yet most
striking was CIA’s assistance with armament including aircrafts.
Suppression of the revolt was nevertheless soon accomplished, and with
the regions undermined, the parties discredited and the prestige of the
victorious army elevated, Sukarno resumed the idea of Guided Democracy in
partnership with the military. Meanwhile, the army chief of staff A.
Nasution had committed himself to the thought that the return to the
revolutionary constitution of 1945 (presidential-type) would offer the best
means for implementing the principles of deliberation, consensus and
functional representation. Sukarno urged this course in a speech to the
Constituent Assembly, elected in 1955 to draft a permanent constitution.
Despite failing the approval of the necessary two-thirds for majority, he
introduced it through a presidential decree of dubious legality.
In both regions, as well as in other islands of the Pacific,
population claim Melanesian ancestrality, not identifying themselves with
Indonesia, predominantly Malaysian.
The country has always been tormented by regional rebellions. From the
perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist movements, even in Java (where in the
district of Acheh, a Moslem state practically subsisted between 1948 and
1962), Sumatra and Celebes as we’ve seen but also Kalimantan, to those
involving Christian groups as in the South Moluccas. Still in 1984 the
Movement for the Liberation of Papua erupted in attacks against the main
cities of the territory, hoisting their flag in the capital opposite to the
Regional Parliament.
The power of Sukarno depended along the years of the preservation of
the equilibrium between the army and the Communist Party (PKI). The period
assisted to the crescent popularity of the communists due to the consistent
protection moved by the President in face of the incursions of the
militaries. he opposed to the prohibitions of congresses and editorials,
banished political organizations patronized by the military to blacken the
PKI, placing some of their militants in political posts. Many analysts
think that Sukarno was preparing the Path for the rise of the communists to
the power. Others say that his action intended to assure a the permanently
threatened equilibrium
The coup of Suharto and the military. On the night of September 30,
1965, a group of subaltern officials based at Halim Air Base attempted a
coup d’йtat to anticipate what they alleged to be the take-over of a pro-
Western council of generals. But by following morning the Strategic Reserve
of the Army Forces (KOSTRAD), commanded by Suharto, had concluded a
successful counter-attack. For specialist Benedict Anderson, of Cornell
University, it seems odd that Suharto, who would gather the reins of power
into his hands, hadn’t been aimed at by the «30th of September Movement»
which assassinated six army generals (while a seventh, A. Nasution,
escaped).
With propaganda that implicated important nationalist and communist
politicians in the first stroke and the estimulation of the widely spread
resentment of the pro-Chinese PKI was object of among the Indonesian
Islamic groups, the militaries gradually assumed power. Suharto begun to
maintain the already wasted and sickened Sukarno in a fictional presidency,
as a symbol of national unity until by decree emptying his legal authority,
in March 11, 1966. The next semester would be fatal for more than half a
million Chinese and Indonesian besides an excess of 200 thousand political
prisoners which altogether formed one of the greatest Communist parties of
the World. The wave of hysteria was such that they were pointed out and
oftenly even executed by their proper neighbor civilians in the villages.
Formation of East-Timorese political associations
During Portuguese dictatorship, civilians were prohibited to gather
for political discussions. But since the 60’s an educated elite with
nationalist aspirations begun to reune clandistinely and vehicle some
principles in catholic press. Three weeks after the democratic Revolution,
formation of political associations was incentivated, in the process of
decolonization. Immediatly UDT was founded, wanting to prolong Portugal’s
presence in view of a progressive autonomy. ASDT, future Fretilin, called
for radical independence, while Apodeti, supported by Indonesia, for the
integration of East Timor in the neighbour power.
Although the changes acrossing the metropolis were of little immediate
effect in the rural society, they had profound impact among the elites of
East Timor, particularly in the administrator sectors, centered in the
cities and specially in Dili They polarized the opposition to certain
aspects of the Portuguese rule.
Since the 60s, an educated elite with nationalist aspirations began to
emerge, often product of the catholic schools and particularly from the
seminaries of Dare (outside Dili) and S. Jose in the colony of Macao.
Discussions involved small groups of students and administrators that
gathered clandestinely in the capital. The main escapes of their ideas were
catholic publications of reduced circulation like Seara, which was closed
down by the political police PIDE.
The conclusions reached are considered general and vagrant. Subjects
like traditional marriage and the educational system were debated but not
much was proposed as a global critic and alternatives.
Anyhow, this collective of student-administrators and higher level
bureaucrats, as well as important rural proprietors would constitute the
basis of the two main political parties: UDT and ASDT/Fretilin.
Three weeks after the Revolution 25th of April, the Governor of East
Timor created the Commission for the Autodetermination which’s intentions
were to bring out to legality all the incipient political associations.
The parties
UDT (Timor Democratic Union). This became the first party, was also
the most popular for some months. The initial declaration, of May 11th,
made apology of democratic principles, distribution of revenues and, the
fulcral aspect, a progressive autonomy materialized with an increasing
participation of the Timorese but always in the light of the Portuguese
flag, to culminate with the integration of East Timor in a Portuguese
language community. The political platform as conceived by first president
Mбrio Carrascalгo was to hold Portugal’s presence as far as possible
without putting aside the option for independence. But although having
presented a cohesive front at start, the course of events in the months
followed would evidence different susceptibilities towards a same problem.
Firmly based on two groups, the higher positioned administrator elite
and the larger proprietors of coffee plantations. UDT accounted still the
favours of many suco liurais, although the majority of these belonged to
the circle of the imposed chiefs, in an ancient practice of the colonial
government to substitute the legitimate when less malleable… They used
their influence to gain support for the party in the countryside managing
strong implantation in areas like Liquie, Maubara, Maubisse, Ainaro,
Manatuto, Laclubar.
While a group of conservatives were granted support by traditional
chiefs and administrators — whose positions and privileges under
Portuguese rule made them emphasize a continuation with the metropolis —,
those with commercial preoccupations of economical diversification beyond
the Portuguese orbit focused on the advantages of independence.
Not until 27 of July did the MFA in Lisbon determine the new
orientation in relation with the colonial territories. By it, the Timorese
were officially and for the first time confronted with the possibility of
independence.
In a Message to the Portuguese President, UDT still inquired about the
viability of federation, but no further elucidation was obtained. Few days
later, UDT published the provisional statutes where preconized
autodetermination oriented to federation with Portugal, with an
intermediate phase for obtention of independence, and rejecting integration
in any potential foreign country. It is probable that the discouragement of
a definite bind with Portugal had also to do with the winds of independence
that blew from the ancient metropolis. Spreading throughout the African
colonies, in East Timor it influenced a crescent opposing party of
independist militancy that defied UDT’s hesitations: ASDT.
Amongst UDT founders pontificated the mentioned Mario Carrascalгo,
proprietor of coffee plantations, director of the Agriculture Services, and
also former leader of caetanist party ANP (Popular National Association),
the only one allowed. Ex-seminarist Lopes da Cruz was too a ANP member and
director of Timor’s journal, A Voz de Timor, patronized by the government.
He and intellectual Domingos de Oliveira were custom officials. Cesar
Mouzinho was Mayor of Dili.
ASDT/Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor). The
plan of ASDT was acknowledged in the proper day of it’s foundation, 20th of
May. Adopting the doctrines of socialism and democracy it called upfront
for a gradual independence preceded of administrator, economical, social
and political reforms. Three to eight years was the period of transition
considered necessary. And from the beginning with the participation of the
Timorese in the administration.
In the majority, ASDT was constituted with recent recruited members of
the urbane elites, mainly those living in Dнli, which maintained the link
to the rural areas of where they came from. Some were even descendants of
liurai families.
With an average age under 30, the elder Xavier do Amaral, of 37,
became ASDT’s chairman. The leaders were commited to nationalism and
reaffirmation of the Timorese culture, agreed on the priority of
agricultural development, on alphabetization and extensive health
programmes. But furthermore, the political perspectives deferred. The
dominating tendency between the founders of ASDT was clearly social-
democratic, represented by men like journalist Ramos-Horta, administrator
Alarico Fernandes, Justino Mota and former professor Xavier do Amaral.
Ramos-Horta says that for him and the majority of his colleagues it
represented social justice, equitative distribution of the country’s
wealth, a mixed economy and a parliamentary system with extended democratic
liberties. As to what extent did they have a model, sociologist John G.
Taylor mentions the social-democracy of the 60 and 70’s in Austria and
Scandinavia. Anyway it wasn’t experimented, as the urgency to gain internal
and foreign support seems to have kept on depriving the opportunity.
Still during the ASDT period, a secondary current leaded by ancient
sergeant and administrator, also ex-seminarist, Nicolau Lobato, “combined a
fervent anticolonial nationalism with notions of economical and political
development self-reliance based upon the experiences of Angola and
Mozambique”. His ideas would begin to prevail after the transformation of
ASDT into FRETILIN.
Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association). In 25 of May a
third party appeared under the designation of Association for the
Integration of Timor in Indonesia. Renamed Apodeti, the manifesto of the
party defended an integration with autonomy in the Republic of Indonesia in
accordance to the International Law and principles such as the obligatory
teaching of the Indonesian language (Indonesian Bahasa), free education and
medical assistance, and the right to go on strike.
The visionaries of Apodeti parted from the assumption that Portugal
would abandon East Timor and that the idea of independence couldn’t stand a
chance because of Indonesia. In reality, the revindication of autonomy in a
process of integration appeared more as a popular measure and than as a
political stand.
It has been written that in the beginning of the 60’s, BAKIN (military
co-ordinator agency of the secret intelligence INTEL), mounted a net in
East Timor which dealed with merchants, custom-house functionaries and
agents from the Indonesian consulate of Dili, in change of favours,
payments and refuge in case of conflict. Among them, those who would become
the prominent leaders of Apodeti: professor and administrator Osуrio
Soares, liurai of Atsabe (near the boarder of Indonesian Timor) Guilherme
Gonzalves, and cattle breeder Arnaldo dos Reis Arajo.
Still before the Portuguese Revolution, BAKIN had trained East-
timoreses in radio transmissions and as interpreters.
Nevertheless, while UDT and ASDT/Fretilin rapidly reached to the
thousands of adepts, Apodeti wouldn’t reach more than a couple of hundreds
during the whole year of ’74.
The support came mainly from the sucos of Guilherme Atsabe and a small
Muslim community of Dili. Besides this it had no expression. The dubious
personalities of it’s leaders, all with criminal record and their political
purposes made Apodeti in the words of East Timor’s last governor, J. Lemos
Pires “an enclosed organization, with difficulties to dialogue with the
people and government even worse with the opponent parties”. Fretilin
considered Apodeti illegal.
Three minor parties appeared, all more or less insignificant. The KOTA
(Klibur Oan Timur Aswain), meaning «sons of the mountain warriors», was
filiated in the Popular Monarchical Party of the metropolis. Remounting
it’s origins to the Topasses (see Ethnology of the Timorese), KOTA
postulated the restoration of powers to the liurais who could trace their
ancestrality back to the Topasse period in order to constitute a democratic
monarchy, with the king to be elected amongst the liurais. Like KOTA, the
Timorese Democratic Labour Movement hadn’t a programme and agrouped only
eight members, all from the same family. They wished to mobilize the
working class. The Democratic Association for the integration of East Timor
in Australia received money for promises of integration in Australia. It’s
existence was ephemerous because the Australian government departed from
the idea even before the end of 1974.
Of these parties, KOTA and the Labour party were further mentioned and
precisely by the Indonesian authorities with the sole purpose to evoke that
four of the five parties, which they alleged that was the majority of the
East-timorese, had petitioned for integration during the Civil War
On 15 September the United Nations Security Council unanimously
authorised the establishment of a multinational force in Timor (UNSCR
1264). The resolution gives the force three tasks for its mandate: first,
to restore peace and security to East Timor; second to protect and support
the United Nations Mission in East Timor and; third, to facilitate within
force capabilities humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor. The
multinational force is commanded by Australia’s Major General Peter
Cosgrove
Australian support
The multinational force has been authorised by the United Nations
Security Council, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to use
all necessary measures to achieve its mandate. The multinational force
would prepare the ground for the United Nations to complete its task of
managing East Timor’s transition to independence. This will involve the
arrival as soon as possible of a fully-fledged blue helmet UN peacekeeping
operation and the establishment of a UN transitional administration.
Australian support for peacekeeping operations is not something new –
Bougainville is but one ongoing example. But the East Timor operation –
multilateral in scope, strongly representing South East Asia, led by
Australia and conducted under a United Nations Chapter VII or peace
enforcement mandate – is of a very different nature. This is the first time
that Australia has been asked by the United Nations to build and lead a
multinational force and to provide the largest single component. When
Australia’s deployment was at full strength, it had committed 4,500 troops.
Australian involvement in the East Timor crisis is not motivated by
any desire to cause difficulties in relations between Australia and
Indonesia. It is important that Australia is in East Timor at the request
of the United Nations and with the agreement of the Indonesian Government.
It was in Australia’s vital interests that Indonesia be a peaceful, stable
and democratic state, economically prosperous and playing a leading and
respected role in the region. It was also in Indonesia’s own interests to
ensure East Timor’s transition is a peaceful and orderly one. Australia’s
efforts in building the relations with Indonesia were directed to that
outcome.
With respect to defence relations, it is in australian security
interests to have links such as defence attache representation, high-level
strategic talks, staff college courses, maritime surveillance and disaster
relief exercises. Such contacts are necessary to achieve the objectives in
East Timor, and are desirable because defence links will be part of any
effective long-term relationship with Indonesia. That decision shows the
challenges Jakarta and Canberra face in maintaining a working defence
relationship that supports the long-term national and strategic interests
of both countries.
Prime Minister Howard has said that “the deployment of Australian
troops to East Timor meets the test of national interest in two respects.
First, in the spirit of Australia’s military tradition, troops are going to
defend what Australian society believes to be right. The troops are not
going to occupy territory, to impose the will of Australia on others or to
act against the legitimate interests of another country. Rather, they go to
East Timor at the request of the United Nations and with the agreement of
the Indonesian government. INTERFET troops are defending East Timor’s
desire for independence, as delivered in a free vote granted to them by the
Indonesian Government and with the blessing of the international community.
In addition, INTERFET troops will facilitate the humanitarian relief that
is so desperately needed for the hundreds of thousands of displaced people
in East Timor.
Second, Australian troops in East Timor will work to put an end to the
terrible violence that prevailed immediately after the result of the ballot
was announced. Apart from the human cost, the scale of violence we
witnessed undermines Australia’s own interest in a stable region. The
troops will prepare the way for the United Nations to undertake the vital
task of developing a transitional political and administrative framework
for East Timor. For East Timorese, this offers the hope of reconciliation
among groups that have fought each other for decades and the opportunity to
create their own future. They have a responsibility to come to grips with
these issues. For Indonesia, it will more readily be able to concentrate on
its nation building task, with the full support of the international
community.”
USA admits Timorese right to self-determination
On a letter to Senator Russel Feingold, dated December 27th, 1996,
U.S. President Bill Clinton recognized, for the first time, that he «noted
with interest your [a group of 15 U.S. Senators] support of a UN-sponsored
self-determination referendum in East Timor».
Indonesia admits independence
For the first time in 23 years, Indonesia has admitted the right of
the Timorese people to indepence. Last January, on the eve of another high-
level bilateral summit on East Timor between the Portuguese and Indonesian
Foreign Ministers, at the United Nations’ headquarters in New Yourk, the
Indonesian authorities stated that if the East Timorese rejected the
current authonomy plan offered by Indonesia, the central government in
Jakarta would be ready to let them separate from their invadors.
Only a couple of weeks later, president B.J. Habibie announced, at a
meeting with indonesian businessmen at the Chamber of Commerce, that by
January 1st, 2000 the problem of East Timor would be ‘fixed’: either the
Timorese accepted the «large-scale authonomy» proposed by the Indonesian
government in New York (August 5th, 1998), or Indonesia «would wave them
goodbye». It was the first time the Indonesian authorities openly talked of
independence for East Timor.
Meanwhile, the situation on the territory has worsened in the last
months, followin the alleged massacre at Alas (south of Dili) last
December, when as much as 52 people would have been killed. The military
(18,000 soldiers currently serve in the occupied territory, according to
intelligence data smuggled out of East Timor by a dicident officer — that
is, 1 for each 40 East Timorese, or proportionally 7 times more than in the
rest of Indonesia) have been arming civilian militia, in what international
observers consider to be a move aimed at starting a civil war on the verge
of Indonesia’s leave.
Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor
The Governments of Indonesia and Portugal, recalling General Assembly
resolutions and the relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the
Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of East Timor;
bearing in mind the sustained efforts of the Governments of Indonesia and
Portugal since July 1983, through the good offices of the Secretary-
General, to find a just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable
solution to the question of East Timor; recalling the agreement of 5 August
1998 to undertake, under the auspices of the Secretary-General,
negotiations on a special status based on a wide-ranging autonomy for East
Timor without prejudice to the positions of principle of the respective
Governments on the final status of East Timor; having discussed a
constitutional framework for an autonomy for East Timor on the basis of a
draft presented by the United Nations, as amended by the Indonesian
Government; noting the position of the Government of Indonesia that the
proposed special autonomy should be implemented only as an end solution to
the question of East Timor with full recognition of Indonesian sovereignty
over East Timor; noting the position of the Government of Portugal that an
autonomy regime should be transitional, not requiring recognition of
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor or the removal of East Timor from
the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General Assembly, pending
a final decision on the status of East Timor by the East Timorese people
through an act of self-determination under United Notions auspices; taking
into account that although the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal each
have their positions of principle on the prepared proposal for special
autonomy, both agree that it is essential to move the peace process
forward, and that therefore, the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal
agree that the Secretary-General should consult the East Timorese people on
the constitutional framework for autonomy attached hereto as an annex;
bearing in mind that the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal requested
the Secretary-General to devise the method and procedures for the popular
consultation through a direct, secret and universal ballot signed up in New
York on this 5th day of May, 1999 the Agreement Between the Republic of
Indonesia and the Portugese Republic on the Question of East Timor
“Article 1 Request the Secretary-General to put the attached proposed
constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor
within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people, both
inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or
rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret
and universal ballot.
Article 2 Request the Secretary-General to establish, immediately after the
signing of this Agreement, an appropriate United Nations mission in East
Timor to enable him to effectively carry out the popular consultation.
Article 3 The Government of Indonesia will be responsible for maintaining
peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the popular
consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way in an atmosphere
free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side.
Article 4 Request the Secretary-General to report the result of the popular
consultation to the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as
to inform the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the East Timorese
people.
Article 5 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result
of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that,
the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is acceptable to
the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall initiate the
constitutional measures necessary for the implementation of the
constitutional framework, and the Government of Portugal shall initiate
within the United Nations the procedures necessary for the removal of East
Timor from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the General
Assembly and the deletion of the question of East Timor from the agendas of
the Security Council and the General Assembly.
Article 6 If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result
of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the
proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to
the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the
constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus
restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to 17 July
1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the Secretary-
General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of
authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall,
subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure
enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.
Article 7 During the interim period between the conclusion of the popular
consultation and the start of the implementation of either option, the
parties request the Secretary-General to maintain an adequate United
Nations presence in East Timor. “
Conclusion
On August, 30th, History was written in East Timor: 98.6% of
registered voters exercised their democratic right in a UN-organised
referendum, considered by the Indonesian authorities as «free and fair».
Defying eight months of intimidation by indonesian-armed militiamen, mostly
transmigrated from West Timor, the population stood in long queues at the
ballot sites, in some cases waiting hours in the sun after walking
kilometres to the nearest polling station.
Hardly anybody partied in Dili, though, or in the rest of the
territory; celebrations were held abroad, though, in Australia, Portugal,
the United States, Ireland, England, Mozambique, even Indonesia, wherever a
Timorese community is to be found. But inside the new Nation, just four
hours after the official announcement, the defeated militia gangs started
to set East Timor on fire. BBC, CNN, and other international TV stations
broadcasted to the world images once seen in other war scenarios — fire of
automatic weapons, houses set on fire, innocent civilians seeking shelter
in the schools, the churches, the neighbouring mountains. International
media reports mentioned 145 deaths in Dili only, in the 48 hours following
the announcement. On September, 5th and 6th, most international observers,
journalists and the civilian personnel of UNAMET were evacuated from the
territory, either by chartered planes or the Australian Air Force. On the
afternoon of September, the 5th, four indonesian ministers — including
Defence and Foreign Affairs holders, General Wiranto and Mr. Ali Alatas —
and one secretary of State paid a 4-hour visit to Dili — though they never
left the airport «for security reasons».
On the evening of that same day, the UN Security Council, gathered on
an emergency meeting in New York, once more abstained from sending in a
peace-keeping force. The Indonesian authorities claimed to be able to
restore peace and tranquility, though 20.000 men already stationed in the
territory failed to do so until now, and were even reported to have
participated, in some cases directly, in the new mass killings started on
September, 4th. TV, photographic and oral evidence from UNAMET staff and
international media wasn’t enough, so the Council decided to send a «fact-
finding mission» to Jakarta.
On the morning of September, the 6th, the home of Nobel Peace Prize
winner, Ximenes Belo, was set on fire. The bishop seaked refugee in Baucau,
though he was impotent to save the hundreds of refugees in his frontyard,
now facing death or deportation to West Timor, like so many before them.
More than 1,000 refugees were sheltered at the UNAMET compound in Dili, and
the UN convoys were shot at in the road to the airport.
Despite several United Nations Resolutions on the right of the
Timorese to self-determination (the UN has never recognized the indonesian
annexation of the territory), the international community has been blind to
the fight of its inhabitants. Only since November 12th, 1991, when more
than 250 youngsters were killed during a brutal massacre occurred in a
cematery in Dili (the capital city of East Timor), have the «civilized»
nations condemned Indonesia in a more consistent way. But words of
condemnation sound empty when the same countries sell arms to the regime (a
dictatorship ruling Indonesia for decades), and strengthen the economic
ties binding European and American states to Jakarta.
The five days which mediated until official results were announced
were days of tension, with frequent militia attacks in Dili and other spots
in the territory. But on the morning of September, 4th, UNAMET (United
Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor) leader Ian Martin announced the
results, minutes after the United Nations’ Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,
had done the same in New York: 21.5% of the voters had chosen to accept the
Special Autonomy offered to the territory by Indonesia, while an
overwhelming majority of 78.5% reffused it, thus laying the Path to
independence.
The sources
. Aditjondro, George J In The Shadow of Mount Ramelau: The Impact of the
Occupation of East Timor, The Netherlands, 1994
. Aubrey, Jim Free East Timor – Australia’s Culpability in East Timor’s
Genocide. Vintage – Random House Australia
. Carey, P & GC Bentley East Timor at the Crossroads, The Forging of a
Nation, Cassell, NY, 1995
. CIIR/IPJET International Law and the Question of East Timor, London, 1995
. Cox, Steve Generations of Resistance: East Timor, Cassell, UK, 1995
1995
. Timor: A People Betrayed , ABC Books, Sydney, 1996
. East Timor: No Solutions Without respect for Human Rights: Bi-Annual
Report of Human Rights Violations, January to June 1998
. Violence by the State Against Women in East Timor: A Report to the UN
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Including its Clauses and
Consequences
. East Timorese Political Prisoners
. Breaking the Cycle of Human Rights Violations in East Timor: Annual
Report of Human Rights Violations in East Timor 1997
. Hobart East Timor Committee Hobart East Timor Committee – Papers, 1998
Jardine, Matthew
. Ramos Horta, Jose, International Perspectives on Children of War, Family and Conciliation Courts Review Vol 36 No 3 July 1998
. Salla, Michael E, Creating the ‘Ripe Moment’ in the East Timor Conflict,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 1997
. ETAN/US — Pamphlets/Reports NY,USA
. Indonesia and East Timor: On the verge of change? Charles Scheiner,
Matthew Jardine & Sidhawati ETAN, Global Exchange & Justice for All,
April 1998
